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SOCIAL COMMENTARY:
VALUES AND LEGAL PERSONHOOD*
JEFFREY A. PARNESS**
INTRODUCTION
I believe it generally unwise to vote for one-issue candidates
since they are often unversed in the great diversity of issues
that surely will confront them if elected. Similarly, in law, I
believe across-the-board implementations of any single societal
value are generally unwise for they typically undermine other
established values. Thus, before voting for a one-issue candidate
and before fully implementing a single value into law, I believe
one must be confident that the issue and the value are so impor-
tant that all other concerns are properly deemed secondary. Be-
cause such important issues and values are rarely found, few
one-issue candidates are elected and few values are absolute
under law. One generally votes for candidates because they best
represent his views on all relevant issues and seeks to live
under a legal system which best represents his view on the
proper balance of competing values.
While the need for the balancing of competing values in
lawmaking might appear self-evident, there are occasions when
lawmakers consider implementing a particular value without
considering other conflicting values. A certain value might be
deemed so important that it overrides other countervailing
values, but such an assessment should only be made after there
has been a full deliberation of the consequences. This delibera-
tion is especially crucial when implementation is sought through
an amendment to the Constitution of the United States,1 since
* This paper is based upon an address delivered by the author at the Four-
teenth Conference on Value Inquiry at the College of Arts and Science at
Geneseo of the State University of New York. The conference was held on April
18 and 19, 1980, and its topic was Values in the Law.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law, JD.,
University of Chicago; B.A., Colby College.
' U.S. CONST. art. V provides the necessary procedure for amendment of the
Constitution:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
1
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that amendment process is far more difficult than the process in-
volved in revision of most other legal documents.
Over the past few years, and particularly since the United
States Supreme Court's seminal decision in Roe v. Wade,2 there
have been loud cries to equate genetic conception with the in-
ception of personhood under the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments of the Constitution. Proponents premise their cries on the
facially appealing value that all forms of human life should be
protected by society. One important aspect of the proposed
equation is, of course, that human life begins at conception;3
another is that such an implementation of the value is as ap-
propriate in the political and social realm as it is in the religious
and moral realms.
Since the decision in Roe, the proponents of this equation
have advanced two similar types of proposals for a federal con-
stitutional amendment. The first recognizes constitutional per-
sonhood as beginning with conception, thereby guaranteeing the
right to life to all pre-birth forms of human life.4 The second, and
more prevalent type of proposal, likewise recognizes constitu-
tional personhood as beginning with conception, but permits
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall
call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case,
shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution,
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States,
or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress ....
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 81-21 (Smith-Hurd 1977): "[T]he unborn
child is a human being from the time of conception and is, therefore, a legal per-
son for puroses of the unborn child's right to life and is entitled to the right to life
from conception under the laws and Constitution of this State." MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 94-5-614 (1977): "[T]he tradition of the state ... to protect every
human life, whether unborn or aged, healthy or sick .... " NEV. REV. STAT. §
28-325(1) (1979): "[T]he will of the people of the state ... to provide protection for
the life of the unborn child whenever possible .... In this essay the differences
between conception and fertilization are insignificant, so included in my analysis
are proposals placing the onset of life at fertilization. See, e.g., North Dakota
SCR4015, cited and described in 8 FAM. PLAN./PoP. REP. 99 (1979).
' See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 294, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), and various state
resolutions cited in 3 FAm. PLAN./PoP. REP. (1975); 4 FAm. PLAN./PoP. REP. (1975);
5 FAM. PLAN./PoP. REP. 99 (1977); 7 FAM. PLAN./PoP. REP. 107 (1978); 8 FAM.
PLAN./PoP. REP. 99 (1979); and 9 FAM. PLAN./PoP. REP. 86 (1980).
[Vol. 83
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abortions to avoid maternal deaths.5 The only significant dif-
ference appears to involve the question of whether or not the
state's interest in protecting the continuation of the mother's
life should take precedence over the state's interest in protec-
ting the unborn's potentiality for life. In resolving such a ques-
tion, the value that all forms of human life should be protected
cannot be fully implemented since the protection of one life form
will inevitably foreclose complete protection of another life
form. More generally, however, each type of proposal strongly
supports the value that human life should be protected.6
While the cries for the equation of conception with per-
sonhood are sincere and perhaps involve the most prominent
concern of all human values - the protection of human life - such
cries typically are unaccompanied by any significant considera-
tion of competing values. Thus, the proponents fail to disclose
how their proposed equation would conflict with other, long-
recognized American values. Furthermore, the proponents make
no reference to the traditional laws which support these other
values, thereby implicitly, if not explicitly, recognizing that the
protection of human life should begin only at birth.
Roe v. Wade and the Protection of the Unborn
The decision in Roe v. Wade prompted much of the pre-
viously discussed criticism, in part because it was read to be a
clear and sweeping rejection of government's ability to protect
pre-birth forms of human life. 7 While the Court's decision does
' See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 51, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. REP. No. 22, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
' Even when possible protection of only one life is at stake, the proposals
seemingly still would not grant absolute protection. Under the fifth amendment
to the Constitution, deprivation of life by the federal government would still be
permitted where there was due process of law; and under the Constitution's four-
teenth amendment, deprivation of life by state governments would still be per-
mitted where there was due process of law. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976), and its companion cases, wherein the Court held that under certain cir-
cumstances a state may impose the death penalty for certain crimes without
violating the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.
I This criticism was further encouraged by certain judicial decisions. See,
e.g., People v. Smith, 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 757, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (1976),
where the court declared: "The underlying rationale of Wade, therefore, is that
until viability is reached, human life in the legal sense has not come into ex-
istence. Implicit in Wade is the conclusion that as a matter of constitutional law
1981]
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reject the view that the attempted societal protection of human
life could begin at conception, it does so in only a very narrow
context. The Court was asked to equate personhood with con-
ception in the context of the fourteenth amendment's protection
of "persons" from state denials of "life" without "due process of
law" and from state denials of the "equal protection of law." At
issue before the Court was the validity of the Texas statutory
scheme regulating abortion; the scheme effectively denied to
many women the opportunity to secure abortions,8 which was
said to infringe upon a woman's constitutionally protected
right to privacy. In striking down the Texas scheme because of
its restrictions on the exercise of privacy rights, the Court nec-
essarily had to find that fetuses were not "persons" possessing
the fourteenth amendment right to "life."9
In reviewing the Texas statutory scheme, the Court found
that three reasons were traditionally advanced to justify the ex-
istence of state abortion statutes: (1) The discouragement of il-
licit sexual conduct; (2) the protection of the health of the
mother; and (3) the protection of prenatal life.10 The Court quickly
disposed of the first reason, indicating that it was an inappro-
priate state purpose, and declaring the statute overbroad in fail-
ing to distinguish between the married and the unwed mother."
Against the other two rationales, both found to be legiti-
mate, the Court weighed the women's recognized right to pri-
vacy. With respect to the state's interest in protecting the
health of the mother, the Court observed that the medical risks
inherent in early first trimester abortions were lower than
the destruction of a non-viable fetus is not a taking of human life. It follows that
such destruction cannot constitute murder or other form of homicide, whether
committed by a mother, father (as here), or a third person."; and Larkin v.
Cahalan, 389 Mich. 533, 208 N.W.2d 176 (1973), where the court interpreted Wade
in a similar manner, by limiting the scope of a manslaughter statute to the
destruction of a viable unborn child.
" Relevant portions of the Texas statutory scheme can be found in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 n.1 (1973).
' 410 U.S. at 156-57. "The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a
'person' within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment... If
this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, col-
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those in carrying the fetus to full term. 2 Thus, the state could
not justify a ban on early abortions by relying on the need to
protect maternal health. With respect to the governmental in-
terest in prenatal life, the Court did say that the states had an
"important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality
of human life,' 13 but held that this interest only became "com-
pelling" in the second trimester. This period, between the 24th
and 28th week of pregnancy,"' had been found by medical science
to be the point of fetal viability. Because a compelling reason is
a requisite to state interference with fundamental rights,15 such
as the right to privacy," the Texas restrictions on early abor-
tions were invalidated. In light of Roe, states may only prohibit
abortions, except when the life or health of the mother is in
danger, after viability is attained. The result is the now familiar
rule that in the first trimester the abortion decision is one solely
between the mother and her doctor; in the second trimester, the
states may regulate abortion to the extent necesary to protect
the life and health of the mother; and in the third trimester, the
states may prohibit abortion completely, except where the life
or health of the mother is in jeopardy.
Notwithstanding the Court's ruling that neither viable nor
nonviable fetuses are persons protected under the fourteenth
amendment, and that a state does not have a compelling interest
in protecting the nonviable fetuses' potentiality for life after
birth, the Court's decision does not preclude a state from
characterizing fetuses as persons or from protecting the non-
viable fetuses' potentiality for life, or continued life. As long as
such characterizations or protections occur outside the context
of the fourteenth amendment they are appropriate." Yet, the
,I d. at 149.
,s Id. at 162. The Court recognized such an interest whether or not the
state's protection rested on "the theory that a new human life is present from the
moment of conception," since potential life was always involved. Id. at 150.
Id. at 163.
, Id. at 155.
"Id.
" A year after Roe v. Wade the First Circuit Court of Appeals observed:
Though the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade [cite omitted],
arguably proscribes as unconstitutional the governmental characteriza-
tion of the fetus, at least during the earlier portions of pregnancy, as a
'human being' for the purposes of assessing the interests implicated by
1981]
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Court's decision in Roe did relate that states have traditionally
only extended their full legal protections to those born alive. 8 It
noted that even when state law extended protections to the un-
born, those protections were contingent upon live birth." So,
within Roe the Court refers to laws outside the abortion context
which would be undermined by a change in the Constitution
regarding personhood.
The Court in Roe described traditional state law outside the
abortion context in two ways. First, it noted that post-
conception but pre-birth forms of human life usually are treated
differently under law than post-birth forms of human life. Typi-
cally, the former have only their "potential life" protected,"
while the latter have their "continued life" protected." Laws
generally better protect the "continued life" of post-birth forms
of human life than they protect the "potential life" of pre-birth
forms of human life.' Thus, the effect of the proposed equation
of personhood and conception would be to place post-conception,
yet pre-birth forms of life, under many of the stronger "con-
tinued life" protections." This contemporary difference between
a decision to abort, that decision neither proscribes the recognition of a
fetus as 'living' nor forbids the government to benefit the fetus.
Carver v. Hooker, 501 F.2d 1244, 1246 (1st Cir. 1974). See also Parks v. Harden,
504 F.2d 861, 864 (5th Cir. 1974), and Green v. Stanton, 451 F. Supp. 567, 568-70
(N.D. Ind. 1978).
Thus, it would even be appropriate for states to include fetuses as recipients
of certain state constitutional rights to due process of law. William J. Brennan,
Jr., State Constitutions and the Protections of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 489, 501-03 (1977); Robinson v. Cahil, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
"s "[T]he unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the
whole sense." 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
"9 "[T]he law has been reluctant to accord legal rights to the unborn except
in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon
live birth." Id. at 161.
" The conceived unborn's "potential life" is protected when the chances for
the unborn's subsequent healthy birth are promoted by the law, even though the
law may not characterize the unborn the same way that it characterizes those
already born, i.e., by not including the conceived unborn in "person" and "child."
I The born's "continued life" is protected when the chances for his or her
continued healthy life are promoted by the law.
I After Roe, of course, constitutional restraints limit those states desirous
of similarly characterizing the born and the unborn, thereby extending stronger
protection to the unborn. See notes 18 and 19 supra.
For example, abortions of post-conception but pre-birth forms of life would
be eliminated or dramatically reduced. See notes 4, 5 and 9 supra. Differing
[Vol. 83
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protecting the unborn's "potential life" and the born's "con-
tinued life" exists even though presumably the sole reason for
protecting the unborn's "potential life" is the state interest
in protecting the unborn's potential for "continued life"; that is,
the state is only interested in the unborn's life after birth.
States do not seek to protect the unborn's "potential life" when
death of the unborn prior to birth is a certainty.
The Court in Roe also described traditional state law affec-
ting the unborn outside the abortion context through illustra-
tions of how American law has never treated pre-birth forms of
human life as if they were persons in all respects. It noted that
the unborn generally have been granted only certain inchoate
rights which come to fruition upon birth," that is, live birth trig-
gers the retroactive vesting of rights upon the unborn. For ex-
ample, it declared that a new-born child typically possesses a
property interest in the estate of a father who died without a
will during the gestation period.' And it found that a new-born
child possesses a cause of action in tort for injuries negligently
caused to that child while in utero.28 Yet, these rights could not be
exercised on the new-born's behalf in the moments before birth.
A child conceived but not yet born generally cannot proceed as a
beneficiary of an intestate father's estate," or as a complaining
party in a tort case.2
Values and the Unborn
Underlying and supporting these American legal distinc-
measures of protection in some areas might continue if differing treatment of the
unborn and the born was found not to be violative of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment or of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
Analogous differences now exist between children and adults. See, e.g., Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
" Supra note 19.
" "[U]nborn children have been recognized as acquiring rights or interest by
way of inheritance .... Perfection of the interests involved ... has generally
been contingent upon live birth." 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
" "IT]he traditional rule of tort law denied recovery for prenatal injuries
even though the child was born alive. That rule has been changed in almost every
jurisdiction" It shall be noted that in some states a new-born's cause of action
may not be allowed if the negligent acts occurred at a time prior to viability or to
conception. Id.
See e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-108 and 2-302 (1972).
,s See, e.g., Morrison, Torts Involving the Unborn-A Limited Cosmology,
32 BAYLOR L. REV. 131, 144 (1979).
1981]
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tions between those born and those conceived, yet unborn, are
several values which have taken precedence over the value in
protecting potential human life. Both within and without the
abortion area, I believe the societal value in promoting in-
dividual freedom and the overall quality of life has at times been
deemed superior to the value in protecting all post-conception
:forms of human life.
With respect to the promotion of individual freedom within
the abortion area, the unborn's protection has clearly yielded to
his or her mother's freedom. In Roe the Court noted that a
woman's right to choose whether or not to bear or beget children,
embodied within the fundamental right to privacy, was constitu-
tionally guaranteed." Therefore, any state infringement on that
right, such as denied access to abortions, was unconstitutional
absent compelling reasons." As indicated earlier, the value that
post-conception forms of human life should be protected was not
found compelling, except where the form of life had reached via-
bility. The nonviable fetus could not have its "potential life" pro-
tected from maternal acts, since the mother was constitutionally
granted the freedom to choose whether or not to sustain the
-fetus' "potential life" by continuing with her pregnancy. While
the mother has no such constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
choice once the fetus becomes viable, most states since Roe have
nevertheless chosen to recognize this freedom as superior to
protection of fetal life where rape, incest or the mother's own
continuing sound mental health is involved.'
Oddly enough, in the abortion context overtones also exist
involving the promotion of the unborn's individual freedom of
choice regarding the potential of his or her life. The Court in
Roe, for example, referred to the future problems to be faced by
the unborn should an abortion not be available.2 Was the Court
relying on a finding that some unborn would choose not to be
born, given the expected nature of their life after birth? Forsee-
able problems such as hostile parents, poverty, physical disabil-
410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
Id. at 155.
S 4 FAM. PLAN.IPoP. REP. 108, 109 (1975).
"There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the un-
wanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already
unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it." Id. at 153.
[Vol. 83
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ities, and mental deficiencies might be grounds for determining
that the unborn's probable choice would be not to be born.
Outside the abortion context a quite similar judicial finding
is sometimes sought. In so-called "wrongful life" suits, children
who are born alive with deformities seek monetary relief on the
theory that but for the physician's acts or omissions prior to or
during pregnancy, the pregnancies would have been prevented
or terminated before birth.3 In effect, children in such suits ask
for a finding that they had an interest in not being conceived or
born and thus have been hurt by the defendants causing them to
be born alive. It should be noted that as yet no jurisdictions
have fully recognized children's "wrongful life" suits.3 4 However,
judicial action in other areas may indicate a possible shift. Most
courts recognize that a terminally ill patient has a constitu-
tionally protected right to choose to live or die. 5 At least one
court has extended such a choice to a patient who is not ter-
minally ill and has life-saving medical treatment available.' Fur-
ther, in justification of compulsory sterilization laws for mentally
incompetent individuals who are found likely to produce disad-
vantaged offspring, a few courts have referred to the rights of
the unborn offspring not to be conceived.
See, e.g., Zepada v. Zepada, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1975), and Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d
807 (1978), modified, Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S. 2d 110 (1977),
which decided that an infant born deformed possesses a cause of action for
wrongful life. Caution is urged to those further interested in reviewing such suits,
since the term "wrongful life," as well as the related terms "wrongful birth,"
"wrongful conception," and "unplanned child actions" are often confused. See also
Note, Wrongful Birth: Fact Patterns Giving Rise to Causes of Action
Distinguished and Discussed, 4 HAMLINE L. REV. 59, 61 (1980).
' But see Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977). For a dis-
sent to such action see Peters and Peters, Wrongful life: Recognizing the Defec-
tive Child's Right to a Cause of Action, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 857 (1980).
1 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976); and Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). See generally Note, The Right of Privacy and
the Terminally Ill Patient Establishing the Right to Die, 31 MERCER L. REV. 603
(1980).
1 In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978), where the
court noted the patient had a right to refuse an operation where the probability
of recovery was good, the risks involved were limited, and there was the absence
of a dim prognosis.
M See, e.g., N.C. Ass'n. for Retarded Children v. State of N.C., 420 F. Supp.
451, 458 (M.D.N.C. 1976), where the court stated: "[Tihe legitimate state interest
19811
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Even outside the abortion context, individual freedom of the
mother, and of others, often takes priority over the protection of
human life, or in essence, the unborn's "potential life." Thus,
relatively few, if any, legal restrictions are imposed upon the
conduct of a prospective mother, notwithstanding rather strong
evidence that certain actions such as smoking or drinking will
endanger the life or health of her unborn child.' Restrictions are
not typically placed on employers, who are free to require pro-
spective parents, as conditions of continued employment, to sub-
ject themselves to tasks and environments which will probably
endanger the life or health of future children. 9 Criminal sanc-
tions often do not cover intentional or unintentional acts taken
against, or causing harmful effects to, unborn children. 0 While
certain criminal sanctions are imposed upon those committing il-
legal abortions to govern acts against the unborn child when
there is no maternal consent and thus when no true abortion
of preventing the birth of a defective child or the birth of a nondefective child
that cannot be cared for by its parent .... "; and In re Sterlization of Moore, 289
N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976), where the court found the interest of the unborn
child sufficient to warrant sterilization of a retarded individual.
" For a review of parent's role in causing prenatal injury see Note, Parental
Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J.OF L.. AND SOC. PROB. 47, 73-75 (1978).
See also King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposalfor Legal Protection
of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1682 (1979), maintaining the viability rule
might be appropriate. For an example of a contemporary legal restriction on
parental conduct see CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1980), which includes
the child abandonment and neglect law protective of children conceived but not
yet born.
" One barrier to many such restrictions has been thought to be the prohibi-
tions against sex discrimination. See Note, Birth Defects Caused by Parental Ex-
posure to Workplace Hazards: The Interface of Title VII with OSHA and Tort
Law, 12 J. OF L. REF. OF U. OF MICH. 237 (1979), and Furnish, Prenatal Exposure of
Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The Dilemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amend-
ment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66 IOWA L. REV. 63 (1980).
11 State v. Brown, 378 So. 2d 916, 918 (La. 1979). In this case the Louisiana
Supreme Court found that a fetus was not a "human being" within the meaning of
a state murder statute even though the statutory definition of "person" included
"a human being from the moment of fertilization and implantation." The court
found in State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978), that an unborn fetus is not in-
cluded within the crime of homicide. Cf. State v. Anderson, 135 N.J. Super. 423,
343 A.2d 505 (1975), where the court declared that "fetuses which are the victims
of a criminal blow or wound upon their mother, who are subsequently born alive,
and who thereafter die by reason of a chain of circumstances precipitated by such
blow or wound, may be victims of murder." In the CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West
Supp. 1980), murder includes unlawful killing of a fetus.
[Vol. 83
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was intended,"1 such sanctions are far less severe than those im-
posed for similar criminal acts against people born alive." More
severe legal restrictions or sanctions would undoubtedly deter
some acts against the unborn, thereby protecting their poten-
tiality for life. Yet, for whatever reasons,43 this deterrence has
not often been sought; therefore individual freedom of the born
has not been diminished.
With respect to the societal value favoring furtherance of
the overall quality of life, again in the abortion context, the pro-
tection of the unborn has yielded to the interests of the born. In
Roe, the court expressed concern for the quality of life for those
already in society who would be affected by the delivery of a
child unable to be aborted. For example, the Court discussed the
consequences on the lives of the mother and other members of
the child's family. The Court said the "apparent detriments" to
mothers unable to abort included "a distressful life and future"
caused by additional, unwanted offspring, "psychological harm,"
the taxing of "mental and physical health," and the "stigma of
unwed motherhood."44 The Court mentioned "the distress for all
concerned" with the advent of an "unwanted child" and "the
problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psycho-
logically and otherwise, to care for it."45 Further, several of the
justices who participated in the Roe decision have commented in
later cases upon the consequences to non-family members of
state denials of access to abortions. They have referred to the
11 See, e.g., People v. Smith, 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976),
where a husband's assault on his pregnant wife, which caused the death of a non-
viable fetus, was said to be punishable under the criminal abortion statute; and
State v. Gyles, 313 So. 2d 799, 800 (La. 1975), where the Louisiana Supreme Court
declared the hitting of a woman with a stick, causing stillbirth, to be punishable
as a criminal abortion.
42 See, e.g., Note, Feticide in California: A Proposed Statutory Scheme, 12
U. OF CAL. AT DAVIS L.J. 723, 733 (1979), stating that "the penalty for murder is
disproportionate to the relatively light penalty for abortion . .. "
'3 Harmful parental action against the fetus may not be deterred because of
the right of autonomy inhering in certain aspects of the family relationship and
certain economic disincentives. See Note, Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury,
14 COLUI J. OF L. AND Soc. PRon. 47, 76 (1978), and Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to
Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The Dilemna of the 1978 Pregnancy Amend-
ment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66 IOWA L. REv. 63 (1980).
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"welfare costs that will burden the State for the new indigents
and their support in the long, long years ahead."' 8
There has also been commentary on the expected quality of
life of those born because of the unavailability of abortions. One
justice has said the effect of precluding abortions is "to relegate
millions of people to lives of poverty and despair."' 7 The thrust
of this point of view is that not only is the quality of life of those
born worthy of enhancement, but there is also some need for
prebirth termination of the lives of those whose projected qual-
ity of life is low.
Outside the abortion context, the furtherance of the overall
quality of life is also often placed ahead of the protection of the
unborn's potentiality for life. There is a famous, or infamous,
early United States Supreme Court case dealing with a state
compulsory sterilization law for female mental incompetents
likely to produce incompetent offspring. In a widely quoted
passage, Mr. Justice Holmes spoke of society's right "to prevent
our being swamped with incompetence" 8 and "to prevent those
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind"'" in upholding the
law. While such lanaguage is often avoided today in light of our
experience with the master-race concept of Nazi Germany, com-
pulsory sterilization laws still exist."
Contequences of Equating the Born and the Unborn
Adoption of a federal constitutional amendment based upon
the question of conception and the onset of personhood for fifth
and fourteenth amendment purposes would have dramatic con-
sequences to the present balance of such competing values as
the protection of human life, the promotion of individual human
freedom, and the furtherance of the overall quality of human
life. These consequences, though usually overlooked during
" Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) and Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
"7 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also
note 44 supra and accompanying text.
" Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
"Id.
Supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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discussions of such constitutional change, are so severe that the
change should not be made. 1
In illustrating the distinction between the protection of the
unborn's "potential life" and the born's "continued life,"52 the
Roe Court applied those concepts to the tort and property
areas." While the ramifications of adopting the aforedescribed
constitutional amendment in these areas are somewhat un-
clear," there is no doubt that certain serious problems would
arise. For example, there would be a need to eliminate the pres-
ent utilization of the viable/nonviable dividing line in tort cases
seeking damages for prenatal injury and involving such claims
as wrongful death" and non-parent (or third party) liability to
children born alive.56 Yet such eliminations are not trouble-
This view is only strengthened by my belief that alternate channels exist
for those primarily seeking to reverse the consequences of the decision in Roe v.
Wade. For example, a more limited constitutional amendment directed only at the
issue of abortion is possible. Compare Florida Resolution H 380 [petitioning Con-
gress to propose a constitutional amendment which would guarantee each state
the right to regulate the termination of pregnancy within its jurisdiction]
with Louisiana Resolution HCR 21 [requesting that Congress consider a constitu-
tional amendment which would prohibit abortion in all instances except when the
mother's health is in danger]. In West Germany where abortion constitutes an act
of killing, the state hopes to "prevent the killing of unborn life through enlighten-
ment about the prevention of pregnancy." Jonas and Gorby, Translation of the
German Federal Constitutional Court Abortion Decisions, 9 JOHN MARSHALL J.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 605, 660 (1976).
Supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
For example, I am uncertain of the extent to which differing legal
treatments of the born and unborn would be permitted, notwithstanding the
guarantees of equal protection. Supra note 23.
0 King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection
of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1661-62 (1979) [noting that most states allow
recovery for injuries to a viable fetus that resulted in still birth].
I See Note, Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J. OF L. AND
SOC. PROB. 47, 54-55 (1978), where the author notes:
Despite universal recognition of an action for prenatal injury [against
third parties], courts have differed over whether the fetus must have
reached a given state of development before there can be recovery. In
most states, recovery is allowed only where the fetus was viable when
the injury was sustained. Although these states have not expressly re-
jected such a cause of action for non-viable fetuses, they have limited
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some. 7 More troubling problems would appear for areas un-
noted by the Court in human freedom and the overall quality of
human life.
Alteration of the constitutional definition of "person," so as
to include the fetus, would impact upon areas beyond abortion,
third party torts and inheritance, and would seemingly elim-
inate many of the freedoms now possessed by those other than
fetuses. Besides the unavailability of abortions, parental
freedom would be newly impaired by the inevitable changes in
the tort, family and criminal law. At least where the parent-
child tort immunity doctrine has been abrogated, 8 children
could sue their parents in tort for negligent prenatal injury,
thereby substantially curtailing parental autonomy; 9 thus, for
example, maternal discretion to smoke cigarettes, take alcohol
or medication, engage in immoderate exercise or sexual inter-
course, obtain employment in a fetally toxic work environment,
or reside at high altitudes for a prolonged period might be
limited." In the family law area as well, greater protection of
the fetus necessarily entails changes in child maltreatment laws.
11 Id. at 56 [noting the trend toward abolition of the dividing line in non-
parent liability cases]. See also Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since
Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. REV. 639, 660 (1980) [noting the desirability and inevitabil-
ity of abandoning the viability requirement in suits seeking wrongful death
recovery by beneficiaries of still borns].
I Note, Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J. OF L. AND Soc.
PRoB. 47, 68 (1978).
" For equal protection purposes, a fetus weeks or months in utero seems in-
distinguishable from a "born" child days or weeks old. Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976).
Given the prevailing rule in Roe v. Wade, the following has been observed:
If children can sue their parents for negligent conduct and can sue third
parties for negligence causing prenatal injury, it is logically inconsistent
to deny the cause of action of a child prenatally injured by parental
negligence.
Note, Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J. OF L. AND SOC. PROB.
47, 84 (1978). Another observer has gone further and stated that "there are no
serious legal problems to recognizing legal protection of viable fetuses equal to
that already afforded newborns." King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Pro-
posal for Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1687 (1979).
Thus, although Roe does not bar states from protecting a fetus' "potential life" by
deterring harmful parental conduct via tort law, states have not afforded such
protection to date.
' Such maternal acts are said to be causes of prenatal injury. Note, Parental
Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J. OF L. AND Soc. PROB. 47, 73-75 (1978).
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For example, state custody of an unborn child could be ordered
by a probate court upon a finding of maternal neglect of an
earlier born child,61 notwithstanding the fact that custody of the
mother might be needed to enforce the order. And in the
criminal law setting, parental acts of criminal abortion or
feticide would need to parallel traditional murder and
manslaughter enactments since the fetus' life would be constitu-
tionally guaranteed,62 and seemingly, there would no longer be
any reason to distinguish further between protecting "potential
life" and "continued life. '63 Such inevitable legal restrictions on
parental, and particularly maternal, autonomy are dramatically
different from contemporary mores; from the traditional role
assumed by the states under the doctrine of parens patriae;"
and from the present federal constitutional guarantees afforded
parents in decisionmaking on matters affecting the family.
In somewhat different ways the freedom of third parties
would be restricted with an alteration of the constitutional
definition of "person." Employers apparently would be required
to provide workplaces which are not fetally toxic work en-
vironments, notwithstanding economic feasibility or business
necessity; this could be particularly difficult given the duty not
to engage in discrimination on the basis of sex.65 Currently, the
Occupational Safety and Health Act" and most state laws67 do
not extend much, if any, protection to the offspring of workers;
and when such protection has been attempted, it has proved in-
adequate."
l See, e.g., In re Dittrick Infant, 263 N.W.2d 37 (Mich. 1977), where a pro-
bate court order granting county department of social service temporary custody
of unborn child based on parental conduct involving earlier born child was reversed
because the probate code read as not extending protection to the unborn.
Supra note 9.
'3 Supra notes 20 and 21 and accompanying text.
, Note, Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J. OF L. AND SOC.
PROB. 47, 77, 81 (1978).
'Id.
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
67 It has been suggested that a "state law which allows an employer to tem-
porarily exclude a pregnant woman from toxic work environment but requires
the employer to provide another job at a comparable rate of pay and to protect
the woman's seniority" would be legitimate. Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetal-
ly Toxic Work Environments: The Dilemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66 IOwA L. REv. 63, 111 (1980).
Id. at 72 and 104.
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As well, third party freedom to undertake other forms of
harmful action against -unborn fetuses would be substantially
reduced by adoption of the proposed constitutional amendment.
For example, at least some states do not now permit criminal
prosecution of third parties who intentionally assault unborn
fetuses,69 thereby ceasing their "potential life," and other states
which do allow criminal prosecution for such assaults often im-
pose lesser punishments than are imposed for similar assaults
on people born alive." Constitutional change would limit third
party freedom by requiring criminal prosecution of assault on
the unborn71 and by mandating that criminal sanctions not dif-
ferentiate between born and unborn victims.72 Incidentally, such
limits on this type of third party freedom could now be im-
plemented through legislative, as well as constitutional,
change;" and I believe such legislation is long overdue, given the
recognized interest of the state in protecting the "potentiality of
life,' 7' the limited decision in Roe v. Wade, and the lack of any
true state interest in permitting such third party action.
Besides eliminating many individual freedoms now possessed
by those born alive, constitutional changes regarding person-
hood under the fifth and fourteenth amendments would also
somewhat undermine the furtherance of the overall quality of
life. As noted earlier, in Roe and elsewhere, members of the
Supreme Court have expressed concern that the quality of life
" See, e.g., note 40 supra, and the recent decision in People v. Greer, 79 Ill.
2d 103, 116, 402 N.E.2d 203, 209 (1980), where in overturning a conviction for the
murder of an eight and a half month old fetus, the court found that "the General
Assembly declined to specifically include the unborn within the potential victims
of homicide or to create a separate offense of feticide."
'o See, e.g., note 42 supra, and MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.322 (MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.554 (Callaghan 1972)). The willful killing of an unborn quick child by any
injury to the mother of such child, which would be murder if it resulted in the
death of such mother, shall be deemed manslaughter.
" The fetus' right to life would be guaranteed specifically by the new amend-
ment, supra note 9, and there appears to be no valid rationale justifying a state's
failure to prosecute assaults.
' Supra note 59.
See, e.g., People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980), and Note,
Feticide is Still Legal in Louisiana, 26 Loy. L. REV. 422 (1980); See also CAL.
PENAL CODE § 187 (Deering 1980). "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human be-
ing, or a fetus ...."
"' Supra note 13.
[Vol. 83
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss3/6
LEGAL PERSONHOOD
of those already born, and even for some of those who remain
conceived but unborn, would be adversely affected by delivery
of an unwanted child. 75 In areas beyond abortion, restriction or
elimination of an individual's freedoms would also diminish in
some ways the quality of life of others; for example, a pregnant
woman's inability to work in a fetally toxic work environment
could cause economic hardship to those relying on her income.7 1
CONCLUSION
Recent cries to equate genetic conception with the inception
of personhood under the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the
Constitution involve perhaps the most prominent concern of all
human values, the protection of human life. Yet such an equation
would have dramatic consequences on the competing values of the
promotion of individual freedom and the furtherance of the
overall quality of life. To date, scant attention has been paid dur-
ing debates on the proposed equation to the consequences of
adopting the proposed equation.
I believe the consequences of constitutionally equating
genetic conception with the inception of personhood are unac-
ceptable. Long-recognized freedoms enjoyed by an unborn
child's parents, as well as by other family members and various
third parties, would be substantially undermined. This loss is
particularly unwarranted because other channels now exist for
advancing the protection of unborn human life without dimin-
ishing individual freedom and the overall quality of life.
Supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
7' Supra notes 60 and 43.
7 Supra notes 51, 57 and 74, and accompanying text.
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